



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11 March 1956

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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Department review completed

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[REDACTED]

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# 1. GREEK REACTION TO CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS

The government in Athens is vacillating in its attempts to control the violent and spontaneous reaction in Greece to Britain's deportation of Archbishop Makarios from Cyprus. This British move brought to a head Greek frustrations and resentments over the Cyprus issue stemming from

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the Anglo-Greek-Turkish conference in London last September and the anti-Greek riots in Turkey immediately thereafter.

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The cabinet, aware of the intensity of popular sentiment, approved a mass meeting in Athens on 12 March. However, it was "extremely worried" over what might develop and late on 11 March withdrew official permission for the demonstration.

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Any further popular demonstrations in Greece are likely to be directed against Turkey and the United States as well as against Britain, particularly since Communist agitators will probably try to give them a generally anti-Western character. The government's anger at London and its need to maintain popular support may lead it to take only half-hearted measures to restrain the populace.

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## 2. NEW SOVIET FARM DECREE LOOKS TO ELIMINATION OF ALL PRIVATE AGRICULTURE

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The Soviet agricultural decree of 9 March appears to be a new attempt by the Soviet government to complete the 25-year effort to eliminate private agricultural production and marketing.

This campaign will be undertaken at some risk of provoking a fall in agricultural output.

Individual holdings of land and livestock at present account for more than half of the peasant's income, but they greatly hamper the collective farms because they encourage the shirking of communal tasks. The decree calls on collective farms to reduce the size of private plots of those who fail to devote the required amount of labor to communal tasks. It recommends a re-examination of personal livestock holdings in a context which clearly implies that they should be reduced. It seeks to make communal labor more attractive by instituting numerous incentive measures, including monthly advances to collective farmers in place of annual lump-sum payments.

Collectivization in the early 1930's was designed to make all property down to kitchenware owned in common. Peasant resistance depressed food production and Stalin retreated to the present system of the collective farm, under which each household may supplement its income received from communal labor with the output of a small personal plot (roughly from half an acre to an acre) and a few animals, which it is permitted to pasture on communal lands. The campaign for complete socialization continued, however, and was particularly intensified in the period from

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1948 to 1952. Again it provoked a decline in production, and Stalin's successors relaxed the pressures in 1953.

The new decree is cast entirely in terms of "recommendations" to collective farms, but the burden of executing it clearly rests on party members, large numbers of whom have been placed in agriculture in recent years. The major tasks will fall on collective farm chairmen and Machine Tractor Station directors. The formula of "recommendations" leaves room for the party leadership to disclaim responsibility for any abuses these officials may commit as the campaign accelerates in the next few months.

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
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#### 4. ANTI-AMERICAN SLANT IN FRENCH PRESS

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The American embassy in Paris believes the French Ministry of Interior may be largely responsible for press stories of 8 and 9 March of arms thefts from an American munitions depot in France. The French press implied that the arms were smuggled into Algeria, and also stressed the fact that Algerian workers on American bases in North Africa receive training in munitions handling.

The embassy comments that while such stories have appeared intermittently over the past year, the present tenseness over Algeria has created a climate of opinion which makes the French eager to find a scapegoat.

#### Comment

These press stories reflect the marked increase in anti-Americanism among the French, one manifestation of which was the French riot in Tunis on 9 March. French officials in France and North Africa have recently stepped up their charges that the United States is interfering in French overseas areas.



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5. END OF MALAYAN TERRORIST CAMPAIGN HELD  
POSSIBLE THIS YEAR

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Organized terrorism in Malaya can be ended this year if Chief Minister Rahman uses his present high prestige to win the co-operation of the Chinese population, according to Lt. Gen.

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Bourne, the British director of operations. He says there has been a definite and favorable change of attitude among the Chinese since Rahman's return from London last month with the outline for Malaya's independence. Recent successes by Bourne's security forces have been the direct result of intelligence provided by Chinese noncombatants.

Comment

There are some indications that the Communists, in order to prepare a role for themselves in an independent Malaya, may decide to call off the war. In the past three or four years the Malayan Communists have been putting greater stress on subversion than on terrorism.

Even if the eight-year-old jungle war is ended, the Communists' coercive capabilities, as well as the emotional appeal of Communist China, will leave them in position to exert considerable control over Malaya's large Chinese population.

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